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ADMISSIBILITY OF JURORS' AFFIDAVITS TO IMPEACH JURY VERDICT
Introduction
"A juror cannot impeach his own verdict" has become a sacro-
sanct phrase of the law. It is applied to deny the admission of
jurors' evidence as to misconduct of the jury itself and of third
parties' misconduct which affects the verdict. While the rule is
well settled, the application of it to various fact situations varies
considerably. Further, confusion is added to the area by the
various reasons offered for applying the rule. Many courts apply
it automatically, the only reason being the afore-mentioned
canon, viz. it is well settled that a juror cannot impeach his own
verdict, a seemingly blind adherence to form alone.
History of the Rule
The birth of the rule that evidence of a juror shall not be
received to impeach his own verdict occurred in England in
1785 in the case of Vaise v. Delaval.- In this historic case an
affidavit of a juror that the jury, having been divided, "tossed
up," and the plaintiff won, was rejected. Lord Mansfield's entire
opinion, the cornerstone of all the conflict today, stated:
The Court cannot receive such an affidavit from any of the
jurymen themselves, in all of whom such conduct is a very high
misdemeanor- but in every such case the Court must derive their
knowledge from some other source: such as from some person
having seen the transaction through a window, or by some such
other means.2
The decision was grounded on the doctrine that a "witness
shall not be heard to allege his own turpitude"; nemo turpitudiem
suam alligans audietur. After the force of this maxim was gen-
erally repudiated in other fields, the rule continued to be applied
due to the eminence of Lord Mansfield's name. Later other
reasons were furnished to uphold the use of this exclusionary
rule.
What makes this case the true beginning of the rule and not
merely a culmination of its evolution is the fact that, prior to
the decision in Vaise v. Delaval, the practice had been to receive
a juror's testimony in cases of this nature.3
In a comparatively short time, as we measure the growth of




law, the pendulum had swung to the other extreme. In 1839 an
English court agreed with counsel's argument that such an affi-
davit "is clearly inadmissable."4 The court advanced as its rea-
sons for this ruling that:
When the jury have openly concurred in a verdict in open
court . . . it woud be most dangerous, and lead to the greatest
fraud and abuse, to set it aside on such statements as that which is
made in this case.5
Fundamentally this is the rule and the basic rationale that was
accepted by American juristic thought and continues to the
present day.
The Rule in the United States
That the vast majority of United States' jurisdictions accept
and apply the principle that a "juror's testimony is not receiv-
able to impeach his own verdict" is a fact acknowledged by
leading authorities.( However, such a statement without a view
of the reasons for the rule and the varying factual situations
which control the application or non-application of the rule is
meaningless.
The public policy argument against the juror's affidavit seems
to encompass a multitude of arguments. In McDonald v. Pless,7
the Supreme Court stated that the recognized rule is based on
a controlling consideration of public policy, which chooses the
lesser of two evils in choosing between redressing injury to the
litigant and injuring the public by permitting jurors to testify
as to what happened in the jury room. Without this rule of ex-
clusion there would exist ". . . a door so wide and [it would]
present temptations so strong, for fraud, corruption, and perjury,
as greatly to impair the value of, if not eventually to destroy,
this inestimable form of trial by jury."s More particularly the
public policy rule is designed to protect the secrecy of the de-
liberations,9 to promote"free discussion and interchange of opinion
3 Dent v. Hertford, 2 Salk. 645, 91 Eng. Rep. 546 (K3B. 1696); Norman v.
Beamont, Willes 484, 125 Eng. Rep. 1281, 1282 (C.P. 1744): "[Wle always
admitted of affidavits; as in respect to a misbehaviour of any of the jury...."
4 Straker v. Graham, 4 M. & W. 721, 150 Eng. Rep. 1612 (Ex. 1839).
* Id. at 1614.
6 McCoRmacK, Ev cECs, § 68 (1954); 8 WIGmORS, EVmEmc, §§ 2345-2364
(3d ed. 1940).
7 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
s Johnson v. Davenport, 3 J.J. Marshall 390, 26 Ky. 261, 264 (1830);
followed in Caldwell v. E. F. Spears & Sons, 186 Ky. 64, 216 S.W. 83, 85 (1919).
9 Sineri v. J. Smilkstein & Sons, Inc., 205 Misc. 745, 132 N.Y.S.2d 475
(1954); Emmert v. State, 127 Ohio St. 235, 187 N.E. 862 (1933); The King v.
Kahalewai, 3 Hawaii 465 (1873).
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among jurors,"' 0 and to lessen temptation to tamper with the
jury after the verdict." In short, it has been suggested that
abandonment of the rule. would result in protracted litigation
and weakened public regard for the "ancient and well-tried
method of trial by jury."' 2 However, a shadow is cast over the
validity of these reasons in the states that follow the general
rule but allow affidavits to be received to support the verdict.'3
It is submitted the evil of tampering with the jury after the
verdict does not change its basic nature because the end desired
is varied.
Public policy is not the only reason advanced for the exclu-
sionary rule here discussed. Courts have also made use of the
more standard rules of evidence, the hearsay rule, the parol
evidence rule and privileged communication. The parol evidence
rule is said to be the basic underlying principle of the exclusion
of jurors' affidavits as the verdict is the final legal act. It is the
outward utterance which is the act and not the prior and pri-
vate intentions. Hence, "the verdict, in which they all concur,
must be the best evidence of their belief.., and therefore must
be taken to be conclusive."' 4 But affidavits are admissible to
correct the written verdict, as to errors in recording the ver-
dict or in mathematical computation of damages, for example,
because this is not the verdict itself.' 5 The courts, however,
caution that "a distinct line must at all times be drawn between
an impeachment of the written record .. .and an attempted im-
peachment of the verdict itself.' 6 From the general principles
of the parol evidence rule can be deduced all the rules that
control setting aside or correcting the jury's verdict. How-
ever, this rationale does not seem to find great use among the
decisions. Most courts rely on public policy alone as grounds for
denying admissibility of the affidavits.
Also infrequently used as a rationale by the courts is the hear-
say rule. When the affidavits are based on the discussions of
the jurors this rule can be used to bar the admission of such
evidence.' 7 Both the hearsay and public policy rules exclude
30 Sandoval v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 430, 209 S.W.2d 188, 190 (1948).
11 Haight v. Turner, 21 Conn. 593 (1852); People v. Pizzino, 313 Mich. 97,
20 N.W.2d 824 (1945).
12_ State v. Best, 111 N.C. 638, 15 S.E. 930, 933 (1892).
'3 People v. Duzan, 272 Ill. 478, 112 N.E. 315 (1916) (dictum); Iverson
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 126 N.J.L. 280, 19 A.2d 214 (1941). The cases do not
discuss the exclusion rule in relation to their ruling.
14 Murdock v. Sumner, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 156, 157 (1839).
'5 Kennedy v. Stocker, 116 Vt. 98, 70 A.2d 587 (1950); Wolfgram v.
Town of Schoephe, 123 Wis. 19, 100 N.W. 1054 (1904).
16 Bauer v. Kummer, 70 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Minn. 1955).
17 Utt v. Herold, 127 W. Va. 719, 34 S.E.2d 357 (1945).
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the affidavits because ".... experience has shown that they are
more likely to prevent than to promote the discovery of the
truth."18 Whether a court today would find it necessary to use
the hearsay rule to exclude affidavits of jurors' discussions is
doubtful. Its advisability is problematical.
The doctrine to the effect that each juror has a privilege against
disclosure in court of his communications to the other jurors
during retirement has the support of Wigmore 19 and is noticed
in at least one Supreme Court case.20
Briefly then, while other reasons sometimes support the ex-
clusion of jurors' affidavits, the rule itself exists as a rule be-
cause of a desire of the courts to protect the jury system from
what it deems an evil which will destroy its purpose and value.
A survey of the fact situations in which the rule is applied
or rejected shows that the line of delimitation lies between (1)
evidence that attempts to show mistakes, etc., in the thought
processes of the jurors and (2) open misconduct not inherent
in the verdict itself. The various fact patterns and correspond-
ing rules can be broken down into four basic situations.
(1) Mistake and Misconduct of Jurors. The deliberations of
the jury should be conducted with the necessary formalities. If
there is misconduct or mistake there is no better witness of it
than one of the jurors himself. However, ever since the decision
of Lord Mansfield this evidence has been excluded.2 ' Hence,
attempts to show misinterpretation of law 22 and misunderstand-
ing of instructions23 will be thwarted unless they come under
exceptions noted below. Attempts to show misconduct are not
allowed;2 4 therefore, evidence to show that jurors spoke of in-
38 Blodgett v. Park, 76 N.H. 435, 84 Ati. 42, 44 (1912): ". .. it is customary
to enforce the rule which excludes such affidavits . . . for the same reason
that the hearsay rule is enforced."
19 8 WIGMORE, EVnDENCE, § 2346 (3d ed. 1940) and cases there cited. The
requirements for a privileged communication are satisfied if these factors
exist: (1) The communication originates in a "confidence of secrecy";
(2) confidence is essential to attainment of the purpose; (3) the relation-
ship is entitled to protection; (4) injury from disclosure overbalances the
benefits gained. The fourth requirement seems indistinguishable from the
public policy rule in substance.
20 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12 (1933). The case discussed the
theory but then said that assuming there were a privilege it did not apply
in the event of fraudulent conduct.
21 Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
22 State v. Veillon, 160 La. 193, 106 So. 780 (1926); State v. Knapp, 194
Wash. 286, 77 P.2d 985 (1938).
23 Collings v. Northwestern Hospital, 202 Minn. 139, 277 N.W. 910 (1938);
Olson v. Williams, 270 Wis. 57, 70 N.W.2d 10 (1955).
24 York v. North Central Gas Co., 69 Wyo. 98, 237 P.2d 845, 852 (1951),
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surance,2 or to show what the jury allowed and disallowed in
computing damages,2s or that they had an unauthorized view of
the scene of the accident,2 7 or that a verdict was coerced by deceit
of fellow jurors,2s or was compromised by freeing one defendant
while convicting another,29 could not be admitted due to the gen-
eral rule excluding the jurors' affidavit.
(2) Misconduct of Third Parties. Where the misconduct that
the juror seeks to show involves the improper acts of a third per-
son there is a conflict between the states that apply the general
rule. Those that admit the evidence distinguish between the acts
of jurymen and influences of third parties which are extraneous to
the deliberations."0 The "extraneous facts" argument coupled with
the public policy that an officer of the court (bailiff, judge, etc.)
should not be shielded by a rule designed to meet another situation
has led to exceptions in some instances.3 1 Most jurisdictions, how-
ever, refuse to relax the general rule that jurors shall not be heard
to impeach their own verdict.32
(3) Testimony of One Who Overheard Jury. This situation is
analogous to the problem of permitting a juror to impeach his own
verdict, as Lord Mansfield suggested in Vaise v. Delaval.33 Some
courts allow evidence from a non-juror of what the jury has said
and done during deliberations to impeach the verdict.34 Apparent-
ly, these decisions turn on the fact that this evidence is independ-
24 continued
where the rule was too firmly settled to be upset by judicial decision
(dictum); State v. Forrester, 14 N.D. 335, 103 N.W. 625, 626 (1905): "Although
injustice may at times result from thus holding... we deem it the better
rule...."
25 Newell v. City Ice Co., 140 Kan. 110, 34 P.2d 558 (1934).
26 Schumacher v. Lang, 160 Neb. 43, 68 N.W.2d 892 (1955).
27 Wilson v. Oklahoma Ry. Co., 207 Okla. 204, 248 P.2d 1014 (1952).
28 State v. Lewis, 59 Nev. 262, 91 P.2d 820 (1939).
29 State v. Corner, 58 S.D. 579, 237 N.W. 912 (1931).
30 Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892). If protection of secrecy
is the object of the rule there is no good reason why jurors cannot testify
as to outside influence. See the discussion of the "Iowa Rule," text at note 51
infra.
31 Wilkins v. Abbey, 168 Misc. 416, 5 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1938).
32 Ruiter v. Knudson, 318 111. App. 211, 47 N.E.2d 534 (1943); and see
Annot., 146 A.L.R. 514 (1943) for a discussion and collection of other cases on
this point.
33 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). Evidence of misconduct cannot
come from the jurors but is admissible from ". . some person having seen
the transaction through a window, or by some such other means." Ibid.
34 Wright v. Abbott, 160 Mass. 395, 36 N.E. 62 (1894); Reich v. Thompson,
346 Mo. 577, 142 S.W.2d 486 (1940).
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ent of the deliberations and does not fall under the sanction
of the rule. Perhaps more important is the fact that this is the
only means by which such misconduct may be established.
The courts that refuse to allow evidence of eavesdroppers, etc.,
to impeach the verdict, accept as a rationale that to do so would
violate the general rule by allowing indirectly what is denied di-
rectly, i.e., invading the secrecy of the jury room.35
(4) Quotient and Lot Verdicts. Quotient verdicts in which the
jury reaches its decision by adding the individual estimates of the
damage and dividing the total by twelve is misconduct sufficient
for a new trial as a determination by chance.36 However, such mis-
conduct cannot be shown by jurors' affidavits in keeping with the
general rule.37 Several states have remedied this situation by
statute to allow affidavits to prove arrival at verdict by chance or
lot.3s
Another variation of the general rule is the aliunde rule of Ohio.
To the general rule that the verdict of a juror may not be impeach-
ed by the testimony of a juror concerning the jury's misconduct, is
added the qualification "in the absence of evidence aliunde." Thus,
where evidence of misconduct is available from a non-juror, the
jurors' evidence of misconduct may come in.3 9
Judicial Criticism of the General Rule
Due to the hardship in individual cases the general rule that a
juror cannot impeach his own verdict has been criticised, not only
by the commentators40 but also by the courts. In 1821 in the case
of Crawford v. State,4 the court severely condemned the rule.
The opinion pointed out that there seemed to be a struggle even
in the minds of the judges who made the rule and that the "...
coincidence of opinion which has formed the majority has not been
founded on the unity of their reasons."42 Then the court pointed
35 Central of Georgia Ry. v. Holmes, 223 Ala. 188, 134 So. 875 (1931).
36 Benjamin v. Helena Light & Ry., 79 Mont. 144, 255 Pac. 20 (1927).
37 Southern Ry. of Indiana v. Ingle, 57 N.E.2d 948, (Ind. 1944), rev'd an
other grounds, 223 Ind. 271, 60 NE.2d 135 (1945).
38 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 657(2) (Deering 1953); IDHo CODE ANNo. §
10-602 (2) (1948); MoxT. REv. CODEs AwN. § 93-5603 (2) (1947); N.D. REV.
CODE § 28-1902 (2) (1943); SMD. CODE § 33.1605 (2) (1939); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-38-3 (4) (1953) (statute does not expressly provide for receiving juror's
affidavits, but in State v. Priestley, 97 Utah 158, 91 P.2d 447, 449 (1939), the
court indicated that affidavits were proper. (dictum)).
39 Wicker v. City of Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 434, 83 N.E2d 56 (1948).
40 8 WIGS oRE, EVIDENCE § 2345 (3d ed. 1940); Jorgensen v. York Ice
Mach. Co., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764
(1947).
4' 10 Tenn. (2 Yerg.) 54 (1821).
42 Id. at 58.
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out that the change in the common law was made after the Revolu-
tion and only those rules prior to it should be part of our common
law, hence "affidavits of jurors are legally receivable here. '43
The court also bulwarked its argument with the points that, first,
to exclude the evidence cuts off the best evidence, if not the only
evidence, of misconduct. At best the exclusion puts the juror below
the level of an eavesdropper whose evidence is admitted.44 Second,
the Tennessee court rejected the worry about tampering with the
jury because "the danger is imaginary; jurors in general are above
attacks of this kind." 45
The second major attack on the general rule was made in 1866
in Wright v. Illinois and Mississippi Telegraph Company.4 6 This
case is the basis of the so-called "Iowa Rule" which is discussed
below. The opinion gave an exhaustive review of all prior leading
cases and after pointing out inconsistencies, concluded that each
of the cases was not decided"... on any recognized or fixed prin-
ciple, but upon its own supposed merits, according to individual
views of the judge.... -47
In 1947 Judge Learned Hand spoke out against the rule,4s say-
ing "the whole subject has been obscured, apparently beyond hope
of clarification, by Lord Mansfield's often quoted language in
Vaise v. Delaval .... -149 He further believes it is:
. . . not improbable that when the question arises in the future,
the testimony of the jurors may be held competent, and that we shall
no longer hear that they may not "impeach their verdict," when it is
"impeachable" if what they say is true. Maybe not; judges again
and again repeat the consecrated rubric which has so confused
the subject; it offers an easy escape from embarrassing chores. 50
However, the rule is so firmly imbedded this seems unlikely to
come about without legislative action. The criticism above has
brought about modifications of the rule, the most important being
the so-called "Iowa Rule."
The "Iowa Rule"
In the Wright case,5 ' supra, after expressing the criticism of the
43 Id. at 59.
41 Id. at 60.
45 Id. at 60.
46 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
47 Id. at 209.
48 Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Co., 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 764 (1947).
49 Id. at 435.
50 Ibid.
51 Wright v. Illinois and Mississippi Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
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general rule set out above, the court stated what it believed to
be the true rule.
That affidavits of jurors may be received for the purpose of
avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occuring during the trial
or in the jury room, which does not essentially inhere in the verdict
itself.. .52
This rule has been applied in some federal cases 53 and accepted by
state courts in a number of instances.54
The American Law Institute in its Model Code of Evidence
adopts the "Iowa Rule." Rule 301 provides:
[Alny witness, including every member of the jury, may testify
to any material matter .. . whether the matter occurred or existed
in the jury room or elsewhere, and whether during the deliberations
of the jury... except.., no evidence shall be received concerning
the effect which anything had upon the mind of a juror . . . or
concerning the mental processes by which it [the verdict] was
reached.5 5
The comments observe that this allows the juror to testify to
every relevant matter except his mental processes and the effect
on his mental operations in coming to a verdict.56 Thus the sanc-
tity and secrecy of the jury deliberations are protected; at the
same time, the percentage of cases where apparent injustice re-
sults to the individual, because of application of the rule, could be
substantially lessened.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the finality of the jury's verdict and their
freedom of discussion must be protected by the courts. However,
in reading the numerous reported cases on the subject one is ap-
palled by the many instances where injustice is done to an innocent
litigant due to the inadmissibility of the only evidence of miscon-
duct available. Admittedly all attempts to draw lines between two
conflicting rules strew hard cases on either side of the line. How-
52 Id. at 210.
53 Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); Jorgensen v York Ice
Mfach. Co., supra note 48.
54 Miami v. Bopp, 117 Fla. 532, 158 So. 89 (1934); Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan.
(Dassler) 415 (1874); Jensen v. Dikel, 69 N.W.2d 108, 114 (Minn. 1955) (dic-
tun); McInnis v. State, 213 Miss. 491, 57 So. 2d 137, 140 (dictum) (1952):
".... may testify as to misconduct of others. .. ."; James Turner & Sons v.
Great No. Ry., 67 N.D. 347, 272 N.W. 489 (1937); Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v.
Bishop, 203 S.W.2d 651 (Texas, 1947).
55 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE, Rule 301 (1942).
5G Id., comment a.
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ever, it is submitted that in drawing the line between redressing
injury to the litigant and protecting the public through the pro-
tection of the traditional jury process the line has been drawn
with too clumsy a hand. The "Iowa Rule," which admits evidence
of facts not inherent in the verdict, appears to be the better instru-
ment for justice. The present position of the rule in the United
States makes this a matter for the legislatures of the various juris-
dictions. It is to be hoped that the Model Code of Evidence soon
finds favor with these bodies.
John L. Rosshirt
